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PROCESSES OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
Andy Bailey & Gerry Johnson 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the processes by which strategy is developed within 
organisations. It builds on research into the nature of strategy development being 
undertaken within the Centre for Strategic Management and Organisational Change 
at Cranfield School of Management. Initially the process of strategy development is 
discussed, a number of explanations of the process are presented and an integrated 
framework is developed. This framework is subsequently used to illustrate the 
strategy development process operating in a number of organisations. The 
implications for the strategic management process are discussed. 
Research in the field of strategic management has typically been divided between 
the investigation of “content” or “process”. Much of the research in the field, 
though, has concentrated on issues relating to the content of strategy (see for 
example Porter, 1980; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). While strategy content research 
is important for the investigation of strategic management, the process by which 
strategy is developed is of equal importance. Indeed, if the process of strategy 
development is to be effectively managed, for example to effect strategic change, 
then the process4 aspects of strategic management are especially important. This 
paper concentrates on the process of strategic management with the intention of 
providing a broader, more realistic picture of the way in which strategy is 
developed in organisations. 
The early works of writers such as Ansoff (1965) and Andrews (1980) and the 
books of the 197Os, in particular on corporate planning, emphasised the importance 
of strategy and have guided thinking in the area; thinking which has been dominated 
by the view that strategies are developed through a particularly ana.lytical and 
intentional process. The basic framework which this ‘rational’ planned view offers 
suggests, that through the application of appropriate analytical and systematic 
techniques and check-lists, organisations are able to secure their own success. 
Moreover such an approach allows assumptions to be made about the future, assists 
in the reduction of uncertainty and facilitates the systematic development of 
strategy. This view and its associated frameworks have become deeply entrenched 
within strategic thinking, while the prescriptive and normative modes so generated 
have significantly influenced the approach to strategy formulation in practice, in 
education, and in research. 
To view strategy development in this logical and rational manner is appealing and it 
is not surprising that this view has enjoyed such prominence. In management 
education, strategic texts have traditionally emphasised the rationality of analysis, 
planning, and implementation as a step by step process. Within organisations this 
school of thought suggests that formal strategic planning processes and mechanisms 
can operate in a rational and objective manner to allow the comprehensive analysis 
of the internal and external environments, the development of alternative strategies, 
the selection of an optimum strategy, and the production of objectives, goals, 
budgets, and targets to guide implementation. In short this rational planning 
approach is often what is regarded as ‘good practice’. 
However, the processes of strategy development which exist in organisations cannot 
typically be explained in such ways. Organisations are open to an array of 
influences both from inside and outside when developing strategy. Consequently, 
the strategy development process of an organisation is likely to reflect the mix of 
influences which come together to direct how strategy emerges. The seminal work 
of Allison (1971), in the context of policy studies, demonstrated that the process of 
strategy development could be accounted for not only in terms of a rational 
framework of understanding but also in terms of both political and organisational 
frameworks. The strategy development process of an organisation may then result 
from, and be influenced by, the broad social, political, and cultural aspects of the 
organisation or from external pressures as well as from a planned approach of the 
organisation to its environment. 
The Emergence of Strategies 
A natural assumption of the rational planned view of strategy development is that 
strategies are formulated and implemented in a linear manner and that an 
organisation’s intended strategy will be implemented in its entirety to become 
realised as actual strategy. Here strategy is conceived of as being formulated, 
perhaps through some planning process, resulting in a clear expression of strategic 
direction, the implementation of which is also planned in terms of resource 
allocation, structure and so on (route 1 in figure 1). However this may not always 
be the case. Unexpected shifts in the environment, unforeseen problems in 
implementation or limitations in the process can operate to restrict the efficiency of 
strategy development and its realisation. The result of this may mean that an 
organisation’s intended strategy is not realised as actual strategy (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). In effect much of what is intended follows route 2 in 
figure 1 and becomes unrealised. There may be all sorts of reasons for this, and the 
rest of the paper helps explains some of these. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The fact that a planned, intended strategy is not realised does not mean that an 
organisation has no strategy. Strategy can be seen as the direction an organisation 
actually pursues over time, intended or not. As such strategy development can be 
conceived of as an emergent process (route 3 in figure 1). 
The distinction between what is intended and what is realised may not be so defined 
and the two may interact. A strategy which starts as intended may alter and become 
more emergent as it is implemented, while an emergent strategy may become 
formalised and more deliberate as it enters the accepted wisdom of the organisation 
and is encapsulated within its longer-term strategy. Indeed, an intended strategy 
which appears to have come about through a planning mechanism may still be of an 
emergent nature. For example, the planning process may perform the role of 
monitoring the progress or efficiency of an emerging strategy. On the other hand it 
may do little more than pull together the views and “wisdom” of management or 
industry experts which has been built up over time. As such a planning system may 
merely operate to support and justify the received wisdom within, and general 
direction of, an organisation (route 4 in figure 1). This route has inherent dangers 
given that the firm appears to be taking a pro-active, systematic approach to strategy 
development, and this may mask a somewhat complacent view of the situation the 
organisation is in. 
Strategies may also come about in opportunistic ways (route 5 in figure 1). 
Changes may occur in the operating environment which may be taken advantage of 
in an opportunistic manner and as such lead to changes in the realised strategy of an 
organisation. Finally, strategy may be imposed (route 6 in figure 1). For example 
government legislation may force an organisation to alter its operations whether 
because of the need to comply with new environmental regulations or the 
privatisation of public utilities. Similarly, a down turn in the economy may force 
an organisation to follow a strategy of retrenchment, with divestments and the 
cutting of costs. The response to such pressure may be dealt with through planning 
mechanisms within the organisation; or it may be through some other mechanism, 
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such as indiv idual decis ion making by senior executives. In any event such imposed 
s trategy  development can result in s ignificant long term changes for an organisation. 
Exdanations of Strategv DeveloDment 
This  next sect ion reviews  in more detail the different explanations  of how s trategies  
may develop. W hile these explanations  are not novel or indeed definitive, they  do 
represent meaningful c las s ifications of the process which make intuitive sense to 
managers and are understandable. It is  important to s tress that it is  most unlikely  
that any one of the explanations  given accounts entirely  for the processes at work in 
an organisation: s trategy  development needs to be understood in terms of a mix  of 
processes. 
The Planning Dimens ion 
Strategic  planning is  perhaps the most traditional v iew of how s trategy  is  developed 
in organisations. The dimens ion indicates that s trategy  development is  a dis tinc tly  
intentional process involv ing a logical, rational, planned approach to the 
organisation and its  environment. Further it implies  that through the application of 
appropriate analy tical and s y s tematic  techniques  the ‘r ight’ decis ion can be taken. 
The s trategies  which develop are the outcome of sequential, planned and deliberate 
procedures and are often the responsibility  of specialised departments. Clear and 
well defined s trategic  goals  and objec tives are set by the senior members of an 
organisation. These goals  may reflec t the desires of the shareholders or potential 
threats  and opportunities  which the organisation becomes aware of through its  
constant monitoring of the busines s  environment. As a goal or s trategic  issue is  
defined, the organisation and its  environment (both internal and external to the 
organisation) are s y s tematically  analysed in terms of, for example, s trategic  
position, the position of competitors, organisational s trengths, weaknesses, and 
resource availability . The information collec ted is  assessed and s trategic  options  
capable of attaining the goal or resolv ing the s trategic  issue are generated. 
These s trategic  options , or courses of action, are s y s tematically  assessed agains t the 
c r iteria of the s trategic  goals  and objec tives to be achieved. This  evaluation 
incorporates an assessment of both the estimated consequences of the alternative 
courses of action, for example in terms of r is k  versus return, and the value of these 
consequences. Similarly  the long-term potential of the options  are estimated. The 
option judged to maximise the value of outcomes, best fits  the selec tion c r iterion 
and presents competitive advantage is  chosen. The selec ted option is  subsequently 
detailed in the form of precise plans  and programmes and is  passed from the top 
downwards within the organisation. Throughout this  process s trategies  are 
determined and guided by those decis ion makers in senior management positions  
and are implemented by those below who act on but are unlikely  to decide on 
s trategy . 
In line with the s y s tematic  development of s trategy , the resources required for 
implementation are determined and appropriately  allocated, and s imilarly  the 
s y s tems for monitoring and controlling the new s trategy  are determined. A s trategy  
developed through this  planned, sequential routine should then be implemented fully  
and in a ‘surprise free’ manner. 
W hile this  planned intentional notion of s trategy  development is  appealing it is  not 
without its  problems and inherent dangers. In particular it lac k s  consideration of 
the les s  ‘objec tive’ aspects of the organisation and their c r itical influence on s trategy  
development. Indeed, this  dimens ion of s trategy  development could be seen as 
devoid of personal emotion or political activity (Etzioni, 1989). Consequently, the 
strategy developed will not reflect the interests of any particular group or be 
restricted by the organisation’s traditions. 
However, regardless of the problems, the discipline and techniques of planning 
approaches can be useful because they may provide a framework for strategic 
thinking. The elements of the planning process represent a useful means of 
analysing and thinking about complex strategic problems and if managers also 
address the problems of managing strategy within the social, cultural and political 
world of organisations, then such thinking can be very helpful. 
The Incremental Dimension 
In the late 1950s Lindblom (1959) suggested that managing strategies through 
logical, sequential, planning mechanisms was unrealistic. He argued that given the 
complexity of organisations and the environments in which they operate, managers 
cannot consider all possible options in terms of all possible futures and evaluate 
these against pre-set, unambiguous objectives. This is particularly so in an 
organisational context in which there are likely to be conflicting views, values, and 
power bases. Rather, strategic choice takes place by comparing options against 
each other and considering which would give the best outcome and be possible to 
implement. Lindblom called this strategy building through ‘successive limited 
comparisons’, but argued that it took place in the everyday world of managing, not 
through planning systems. 
Strategy development as characterised by this incremental dimension involves an 
adaptive response to the environment. Strategy is therefore seen to be worked 
through in action, and does not follow the neat sequential model of analysis, choice 
and implementation. Unlike the planning dimension, this model of strategy 
development does not operate to identify a priori the best or optimal solution 
(Mintzberg et al, 1976). Rather manager5 can be thought of as having a view of 
where they want the organisation to be in the future and try to move towards this 
position in an evolutionary way (Quinn, 1980). 
Managers accept the uncertainty of their environment because they realise that they 
cannot do away with this uncertainty by trying to know factually about how the 
environment will change. Instead they seek to become highly sensitive to 
environmental signals through constant environmental scanning. 
Strategy development is therefore an iterative process, encompassing feedback loops 
to previous phases where problem and solution may be redefined or redeveloped 
(Lyles, 1981), following exposure to the business environment. Commitment to a 
strategy is therefore kept tentative and subject to review during the early stages of 
its development. There is also a reluctance to specify precise objectives too early as 
this might stifle ideas and prevent the sort of experimentation which is desired. 
Objectives are therefore likely to be fairly general in nature. Over time those 
strategies which are successful are retained by the organisation while those that are 
inappropriate are eliminated. This ensures that the strengths of an organisation are 
maintained as changes in the environment are matched with changes in procedure, 
without excessive risk to the organisation. 
In comparison to the planning dimension, this adaptive approach removes from top 
management and the corporate centre the sole responsibility of the task. of strategy 
development, those in the lower levels for the organisation become actively 
involved. Indeed it is the organisation’s sub-systems, each of which is concerned 
with different strategic issues (for example acquisitions or major reorganisations), 
which raise the awareness of potential strategic problems. 
_I . .  
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Fur the r  di f ferent strategic dec is ions shou ld  n o t b e  seen  as  e n tirely sepa ra te  (Q u inn , y’x:x ’ ,~  :.’ 
1980 ) . Because  o f th e  interp lay b e tween a n  o rgan isa tio n ’s ub-systems,  each  -* ~  _  . . ..c 
m a n a g e r  wi l l  know  w h a t h is  co l leagues  a re  invo lved in, a n d  wil l  b e  ab le  to  interpret  
the i r  ac tions  a n d  requ i remen ts. The  m a n a g e r s  a re  in  e ffec t, lea rn ing  from  each  
o the r  a b o u t th e  feasibi l i ty o f a  course  o f ac tio n  in  te rms  o f resource  m a n a g e m e n t 
a n d  its in ternal  pol i t ical  accep tabil i ty. T o g e the r  with th e  cons ta n t read jus tm e n t a n d  
lim ite d  c o m m i tm e n t, th is  know ledge  a n d  unde rs tand ing  a l lows th e  long- te r m  
di rect ion o f th e  o rgan isa tio n  to  b e  m o n i to red  a n d  th e  o rgan isa tiona l  m ix o f resources  
a n d  ski l ls to  b e  a l tered in  reac tio n  to  env i r onmen ta l  changes . The  process  thus  
b roadens  th e  inform a tio n  base  ava i lab le?  bu i lds  o rgan isa tiona l  awareness  a n d  
increases th e  ac tive search  fo r  oppo r tun i ties  a n d  th rea ts n o t prev ious ly  d e fin e d . 
S u c h  a  p rocess  is seen  by  m a n a g e r s  to  have  b e n e fits. C o n tinua l  tes tin g  a n d .g radua l  
strategy i m p l e m e n ta tio n  p rov ides  improved  qual i ty  o f inform a tio n  fo r  dec is ion  
mak ing  a n d  enab les  th e  b e tte r  sequenc ing  o f th e  e l e m e n ts o f m a jor  decis ions.  It 
a lso  encou rages  manager ia l  f exibi l i ty a n d  c rea tivity a n d  increases th e  possibi l i ty o f 
c rea tin g  a n d  deve lop ing  c o m m i tm e n t o  change  th roughou t h e  o rgan isa tio n . 
S m a l ler changes , deve loped  by  m a n a g e r s  th r oughou t h e  o rgan isa tio n , a re  less l ikely 
to  face  th e  s a m e  level  o f res is tance as  th a t faced  by  m a jor  changes , imposed  by  th e  
o rgan isa tio n ’s execu tives. 
The  P o lit ical D imens ion  
This  d imens ion  re flec ts strategy deve l opmen t wh ich  is d e p e n d e n t o n  powe r  a n d  
inf luence.  O rgan isa tions  a re  pol i t ical  e n tities  a n d , as  such , powe r fu l  s takeholders  o r  
interest g roups  in f luence th e  inpu ts into dec is ions a n d  th e  strategies fo l l owed . 
These  stakeholders,  [“any  g roup  o r  ind iv idua l  w h o  can  a ffec t o r  is a ffec te d  by  th e  
ach ievemen t o f th e  o rgan isa tio n ’s ob jec tives” (F reeman , 1984 ) ], wh ich  cou ld  
inc lude customers,  banks , shareho lders , g o v e r n m e n t, t rade un ions  a n d  
o rgan isa tiona l  m e m b e r s , each  have  dif ferent concerns . Concerns  wh ich  m a y  b e  in  
con flict; the re  m a y  b e  di f ferences b e tween g roups  o f m a n a g e r s , b e tween m a n a g e r s  
a n d  shareho lders , o r  b e tween powe r fu l  indiv iduals.  These  di f ferences a re  l ikely to  
b e  reso lved th rough  th e  p rocesses  o f ba rga in ing , n e g o tia tio n , o r  dictate. The  resul t  
is th a t goa ls  a n d  ob jec tives, strategic issues a n d  even  strategies a re  der ived  from  th is  
pol i t ical  p rocess  a n d  n o t from  a n  ana ly tical n e u tral assessmen t a n d  choice.  For  
examp le , th e  dec is ion  to  a d o p t a  strategy wil l  n o t b e  sole ly  based  o n  mer i t, ra the r  it 
wi l l  b e  shaped  by  th e  powe r  o f th e  g roup  p ropos ing  a n d  sponsor ing  th e  strategic 
o p tio n . 
The  level  o f in f luence o r  powe r  these  s takeholders  a re  ab le  to  exerc ise differs 
(Hel ler  e t al, 1988 )  a n d  is o fte n  cond i tiona l  u p o n  th e  o rgan isa tio n ’s dependency  
u p o n  these  g roups  fo r  a  resource  ( P fe ffe r  &  S a lancik, 1978 )  a n d  th e  p o te n tia l  
diff iculty in  rep lac ing  th e  p resen t s takeho lder  as  th e  source  o f th a t resource  (H in ings 
e t al, 1974 ) . S imi lar ly  th e  in f luence o f a  s takeho lder  is n o t cons ta n t from  dec is ion 
to  decis ion.  The  dec is ion  si tuat ion d e te rm ines  th e  level  o f s takeho lder  i nvo lvement 
a n d  b o th  the i r  level  o f in f luence a n d  th e  dynamics  o f th a t in f luence th roughou t h e  
process.  For  examp le , th e  in f luence o f to p  level  dec is ion  make rs  dec reases  as  a  
strategy e n ters  th e  i m p l e m e n ta tio n  stage, wh i le  th e  in f luence o f lower  level  
m a n a g e r s  increases.  
In fluence  over  dec is ions m a y  a lso  b e  ga ined  th rough  th e  prov is ion o f inform a tio n . 
In fo r m a tio n  is n o t pol i t ical ly n e u tral, b u t ra the r  a  source  o f powe r , pa r t icular ly fo r  
those  w h o  con trol th a t wh ich  is seen  to  b e  impor ta n t. In fo r m a tio n  can  b e  distorted, 
intent ional ly  o r  n o t, to  advance  th e  interests o f pa r t icular g roups . These  distort ions 
m a y  resul t  from  th e  prov is ion o f inform a tio n  wh ich  re flec ts th e  interests o f th e  
prov ider  o r  th rough  th e  prov ider  ope ra tin g  to  restrict th e  flo w  o f inform a tio n  b o th  
o f wh ich  can  legit im ize th e  des i res  o f th e  interest g roups  ( P fe ffe r  &  S a lancik, 
1978 ) . 
It would be wrong therefore to assume that the identification of key issues and even 
the strategy eventually selected emerge in a politically neutral environment. 
Strategic options and strategies will be championed, not only on the basis of the 
extent to which they offer benefit to the organisation, but because they have 
implications for the status, influence, and vested interests of particular groups. 
Only through a political process of compromise and mutual adjustment will a 
generally acceptable strategy emerge (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Final adoption 
will be dependent on the strategy’s acceptability to both those stakeholders 
influencing the decision-making process and those who must implement the 
strategy, and not solely because it fulfils objective criteria. 
The Cultural Dimension 
The cultural dimension represents a “way of doing things in the organisation” which 
impacts on the strategy followed. As such organisations faced with similar 
environments will not necessarily respond in the same way. The strategy they 
choose to pursue will not result from a precise planned response to their 
environment, but from the attitudes, values, and perceptions which are held in 
common among the members and stakeholders of that organisation. Further, 
management cannot be conceived of simply in terms of the manipulation of 
techniques or tools of analysis. Management is also about the application of 
managerial experience built up over many years; and often within the same 
organisation or industry. Their experience is not only rooted in individual 
experience, but on group and organisational experience built up over time, for 
rarely do managers work in isolation. It is important therefore to recognise the 
significance of cultural aspects of management in the development of strategy. 
Indeed, strategy may be seen to result from a learned response to a particular 
strategic stimuli based on what the organisation holds as taken-for-granted (Schein, 
1985). 
Strategy development as explained by the cultural dimension is very much about the 
past, about managerial experience and expectations, and about the assumptions and 
beliefs of an organisation. As such managerial action, within the strategic process, 
is likely to be based on taken-for-granted frames of reference which are brought to 
bear by a manager, or group of managers, and which will affect how a given 
situation is perceived and how it is responded to. Indeed, the search for strategic 
solutions and the development of strategy will be directed by past experience, 
similar situations and the organisation’s history. 
Given that future strategy is driven to a large extent by a way of doing things in the 
organisation, then the associated taken-for-grantedness is likely to be handed on or 
inherited over time within a group. That group might be, for example, a 
managerial function such as marketing or finance; a professional grouping, such as 
accountants; an organisation as a whole; and more widely an industry sector, or 
even a national culture. Just as these frames exist at the organisational and sub-unit 
level they also exist on an industry wide basis (Spender, 1989), or indeed at a 
national level. Managers, then, are influenced by many frames of reference when 
developing strategy. However, especially important for the strategic management 
of most organisations is the organisational frame of reference - its specific set of 
assumptions - or the organisational paradigm (Johnson, 1992). 
The paradigm comprises the deep rooted beliefs and tacit assumptions of the 
organisation and relates to the way things are done and what is done. These 
assumptions and beliefs are rarely talked about, and are unlikely to be made 
consciously explicit by managers. Examples might include the deep rooted 
assumption that banks are about secure lending; local newspapers are about 
purveying local news (i.e. as more their raison d’etre than advertising); that 
..- 
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universities are about doing research; and so on. As such, these deep rooted 
assumptions can play an important part in strategy development. 
The paradigm, then, represents a collective experience without which managers 
would have to re-invent their world afresh for circumstances they face or decisions 
they need to take; as such it enables new situations to be perceived in a way which 
is not unique (Schon, 1983) and provides a shared framework through which the 
world the organisation operates within can be interpreted (Schwenk, 1988). In this 
way it allows the experience gathered over years to be applied to a situation so that 
managers can identify strategic issues, direct the search for strategic solutions, 
decide upon relevant information, assess the strategic solution or course of action as 
to the likelihood of success and so develop the “appropriate” course of action. In 
short, it provides a mechanism through which managers can respond to a situation 
in the “right” way and develop the “right” strategy as defined by the other managers 
in the organisation. 
An organisation’s paradigm is, then, built up from different influences such as 
history and past experience (both personal and organisational), industry sector, and 
professional ethos. The strength of these influences will depend on a number of 
factors. For example an organisation with a relatively stable management and a 
long term momentum of strategy is likely to have a more homogeneous paradigm 
than one in which there has been rapid turnover of management and significant 
change forced upon it. Organisations with a dominant professional influence, 
perhaps an accountancy firm, are likely to demonstrate a homogeneous paradigm. 
Industry influences may be particularly strong if the transfer of staff between firms 
is limited to that industry, as it often is in engineering or banking for example or the 
environmental constraints are very dominant and commonly experienced as they are 
for example in public sector organisations. 
Thus an organisation’s strategy will develop in accord and within the confines of its 
culture and dominant paradigm. The cultural influence operates to orientate the 
definition and solution of a strategic problem internally ensuring a strategic response 
is based within the domain of the organisation (Schwenk, 1988) and the history of 
its members (Nutt, 1984). Strategies outside the frame of reference of the 
organisation, which are novel and new are likely to be resisted. As such strategic 
decision making reflects a future and shared direction which perpetuates an 
organisation’s history and routines. 
The Command Dimension 
Here a particular individual is seen to have a high degree of control over the 
strategy followed. As such the organisation’s strategy is primarily associated with a 
central powerful figure (for example the chief executive or a similar figure with 
institutionalised authority). Perhaps less commonly it may relate to the power of a 
small group of individuals at the top of the organisation. 
The determinants of the strategic aspirations and the strategy followed may emerge 
from a vision, which represents the desired future state of the organisation. As 
such, a vision may result from the intuition and innovation of its originator and be 
developed from both intuition and a rational understanding of the organisation’s 
strategic problems; an understanding which enables innovation to be made. The 
vision may be based on radical ideas and may challenge accepted norms, contradict 
established principles and paradigms, and go beyond familiar experience and 
knowledge (Trice & Beyer, 1986). 
. 
A more mundane explanation is that strategic aspirations may simply be the result of 
a strategy transferred from one organisation and context to another. This may come 
about because a new executive applies his or her existing frame of reference from 
another context to the new organisation to which they have been appointed. For 
example some of the new chief executives appointed to the newly privatised UK 
industries in the 1980s came from private sector companies. They brought with 
them frames of reference from competitive environments in which profit motivation 
was taken as given. What was normal and obvious to them, was often seen as new 
and visionary in the organisations they moved into. 
However these strategic aspirations are determined, they are associated with an 
individual to the extent that the individual becomes the representation of strategy. It 
is the individual who becomes the tangible link to strategy and the perceived source 
of that strategy for the organisational members. 
to determine strategy. 
As such the individual is perceived 
While an individual’s vision may represent the organisation’s 
strategic direction, it does not need to be commonly shared throughout the 
organisation. Rather the strategy and future strategic direction are characterised and 
determined by the “commanding” individual. 
Whether the power of the central figure is achieved through the generation of an 
idea and “vision”, through the organisation’s history, or by virtue of position it 
inevitably places enormous strategic control and power in the hands of the 
individual who gains the capacity to translate intention into a sustainable reality 
(Bennis & Nanus, 1985). 
The influence of the command mode of strategy development is likely to relate to a 
particular time phase, for example a crisis situation, and may overwhelm objective 
analysis of the organisation’s position. The history of organisations reveals that the 
command capacity has been an important influence on strategy development, and 
there are examples of organisations in which influential leaders have been effective 
in turning their organisation around. However these influences have then continued 
at times when a cooler examination of the business situation would have suggested 
that their influence and future aspirations for the organisation were becoming 
inappropriate. - 
The Enforced Choice Dimension 
This dimension suggests a process of strategy development in which an 
organisation’s external environment operates to limit strategic direction and choice. 
Indeed, this fits well with the view of some writers on management who argue that 
organisations have little or no control over the choice of strategies they follow. 
Factors in the environment impinge on the organisation in such a way as to 
encourage - even determine - the adoption of organisational structures and activities 
suited to that environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). These external constraints 
operate to prescribe strategies and limit the role organisational members play in 
their selection (Aldrich, 1979). Equally the strategies an organisation can follow 
tend to be common to all organisations within an industrial sector or market. In 
short, the success of an organisation is due to a fit between strategy, structure and 
environment directed by external pressure rather than any rational and intentional 
choice. 
Barriers in the environment operate to restrict the strategies which can be followed 
and reduce the level of intentional strategic choice. Indeed, strategic change which 
does occur is likely to be instigated from outside the organisation. This is a 
responsive rather than a proactive move resulting from external pressure, for 
example, within public sector organisations from pressure brought to bear by the 
government. These limitations are such that influence over the environment is 
likely to be very low; rather the organisations in this instance may have to buffer 
themselves from the environment. 
. . 
4% 
A number of allied assumptions are associated with this dimension. These centre 
around the notion of fit between an organisation and its environment. If fit occurs 
an organisation will survive. If the organisation becomes mismatched with its 
environment then it must adapt or else die. 
change is exceptionally limited. 
However, the ability to intentionally 
It has been suggested that changes occur within an 
organisation through variations in its processes, structures, and systems. While the 
process of organisational innovation and variation may occur as a rational 
intentional response to the environment, they may occur equally unintentionally, 
through conflict over control of resources; ambiguity of organisational reality; 
accident; errors; tactical moves; or luck. It is these variations, however they occur, 
which produce the potentially advantageous or dangerous innovations for an 
organisation. Those variations which fit the changes in the environment and which 
are appropriate and beneficial to the organisation produce advantage and so 
contribute to the chance of an organisation’s or sub-unit’s survival. (Aldrich and 
Mueller, 1982). These successful variations are retained and subsequently 
dissemmated throughout the organisation and across its generations through culture, 
symbols, socialisation, administration and training. 
The view taken in this paper is that for some organisations the impact of the 
environment is, indeed, very large; and that degrees of managerial latitude are 
severely reduced: however, this is not so in all environments; and that even where 
those pressures are severe, it is the job of managers to develop the skills and 
strategies to cope with the situation. 
IntePratinP Views of Strategv DeveloDment 
Each of the above dimensions, described in their singular and archetypal forms, is 
capable of explaining some aspects of the strategy development process. 
given the complexity of both the strategy development process and of the 
However, 
organisation in general, it is unlikely that one dimension would adequately describe 
the process operating in all organisations, in every situation, and at any point in 
time. Rather, it is probable that the dimensions and the processes they describe are 
not mutually exclusive but occur in combination. Indeed, in most organisations 
managers see strategies developing through a mix of such processes. 
As such, this paper does not aim to identify the dimension which “best” describes 
strategy development across all organisations or prescribe the mode of strategy 
development which should be utilised. Rather it aims to demonstrate that 
organisations differ in their process of strategy development. Research has 
indicated that different processes of strategy development or strategic decision- 
making occur across organisations (Mintzberg, 1973; Shrivastava & Grant, 1985) 
and even within the same organisation (Johnson, 1987) and that the process 
operating can and does change. Indeed, given the complexity of strategic decisions 
it is unlikely that strategy development can be explained from a unitary viewpoint; 
the strategy development process is likely to be multifaceted (Fredrickson, 1983). 
Consequently, although valuable in explaining components of the strategy process, 
narrowly focussed or unitary frameworks may simplify the process and not take 
sufficient account of managerial understanding. The complexity of the process is 
therefore more likely to be conveyed by a comprehensive framework of explanation 
than through the application of a narrowly focussed framework (Derkinderen & 
Crum, 1988). 
The research on which this paper is based has thus adopted an approach combining 
all of the above mentioned dimensions of strategy development into an integrated 
and comprehensive framework. It is an approach which we suggest can facilitate a 
clearer understanding of the strategy development process and its complexity. 
understanding is aided through the use of strategy development profiles, the 
This 
construction of which is described below. 
The Strateev DeveloDment PrOfile 
The alternative explanations or views of strategy development, identified above, 
were operational&d to identify characteristics singularly attributable to each of the 
dimensions. Based on these characteristics statements were developed for use in a 
self completion questionnaire, which was administered to senior managers, from  a 
cross section of industries. They were required to indicate the degree to which the 
statements were characteristic of their organisation. Through the analysis of their 
responses, managerial perceptions of the organisation’s process of strategy 
development were revealed. The numerical representation of these perceptions were 
subsequently plotted to develop Strategy Development Profiles of the separate 
organisations. It is important to note that these profiles represent how managers see 
the process of strategy development within their organisations. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Interpretation of the Strategy Development Profile is based on distance from  the 
m id point ring (highlighted in bold). This m id-point represents the standardised 
mean of all those individuals we have sampled, so points moving away from  this 
ring towards the outside of the profile (accompanied by a positive score) represent 
the degree to which the dimension is seen to be characteristic of the strategy 
development process of the organisation. Points moving inwards towards the centre 
(accompanied by a negative score) represent the degree to which the dimension is 
seen to be uncharacteristic of the process. Points at zero or low positive or negative 
scores indicate that the attributes associated with that view are not particularly 
characteristic or uncharacteristic of the organisation. 
Stratew DeveloDment Process In Action 
Using the integrated framework and strategy development profile discussed above, 
the following cases explore the different patterns of strategy development which 
exist in organisations. The potential advantages and problems these combinations 
present are discussed. In addition an example of differences in the perceived 
process from  within the same organisation will be explored to show the potential 
conflicts which may be surfaced and the impact these may have on the acceptance of 
strategic change. 
Case A - The Planning Commander 
The strategy development profile for this engineering organisation indicates that 
whilst strategy is seen to develop through an intentional planned response to the 
environment it is under influence from  an individual with centralised power. As 
discussed above, only in very rare circumstances will a single explanation for 
strategy development exist. 
The organisation is seen to have definite and precise strategic objectives and to be 
developing a number of strategic options capable of attaining these objectives. The 
options are assessed against the objectives to be achieved before the “best” option is 
selected. Precise procedures are subsequently developed for the attainment of the 
objectives with the strategy being made explicit in the form  of precise plans used to 
communicate the strategy throughout the organisation. Strategy development then is 
seen to be based on a systematic analysis of the business environment. 
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However whilst this process is characterised by the planning dimension it is not the 
sole influence over strategy development. Rather influence is also seen to emerge 
- from a senior figure as characterised by the command dimension. Here strategy is 
seen to be associated with powerful groups taking strategic decisions though within 
the confines of both the planning process and a shared “vision” of the organisation’s 
future. Indeed while this vision is particularly associated with the chief executive it 
is also seen to be commonly shared across the organisation. As such it represents a 
commonly shared view about the strategic direction which should be pursued. 
The relationship between the notion of command and vision with the existence of a 
defined planning process raises a number of questions. These centre around the 
extent to which one influence moderates the other or the extent to which they 
actually operate in conjunction. Is the planning process driving the definition and 
communication of the strategic direction of the organisation, with the vision or 
mission simply supporting this commonly shared view of the future? Conversely, is 
the chief executive’s vision the driving force behind the strategy with the planning 
process operating to justify and validate this vision providing the numbers and 
specific actions needed for its achievement? 
In any event, the processes at work appear to have led to the development of a 
strategy which is commonly agreed upon. The low political influence confirms that 
there is little need for bargaining and negotiation between groups in order to secure 
acceptance of the strategy. Also barriers in the environment are not seen to restrict 
the strategies which can be followed, nor is the strategy imposed by those external 
to the organisation. 
- 
This low level of environmental influence suggests one of three scenarios. Firstly, 
it may Indicate that the organisation’s planning processes are such that they enable 
the organisation to keep ahead of the business environment, and so instigate any 
changes before being forced to. Alternatively, the process depicted may represent 
an external business environment which has little impact on the organisation, and 
thus requires little attention. This latter scenario is potentially dangerous if the 
operating environment were to change and become more influential, catching the 
organisation unprepared. Also of potential danger is the third explanation which is 
that the powerful executives who influence strategy have failed to recognise the 
impact of their business environment. 
Case B - The Logical Incrementalist 
The strategy development process seen to be in operation in this major leisure 
service organisation is characterised by an incremental approach to the operating 
environment though under influence both from the formal process of planning and 
from the impact of the organisation’s culture. 
The strategy the organisation develops, emerges gradually as the organisation 
responds to the need to change. It is a highly adaptive process with small scale 
changes being made to strategy in order to match changes which occur within the 
operating environment and the market place. Indeed there would seem to be some 
level of experimentation with the consequences of various strategic options being 
tested out through exposure to the business environment. Here then strategic 
change is likely to build from, and on, the strategy the organisation is currently 
following. It is unlikely that major, radical changes will occur. 
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The process is seen to be adaptive in nature, driven by both planning and cultural 
elements. The organisation has defined strategic objectives which are pursued and 
made explicit through precise strategic plans. A well developed procedure for the 
assessment of potential strategic options exists: a procedure which is likely to 
combine the processes of “rational” and incremental assessment hrough the constant 
testing of these options in the environment. Defined procedures exist for the 
development of the organisation’s strategy, which is undertaken in a systematic 
manner. 
Cultural influences are also an important dimension. These are seen to relate to a 
particular way of doing things in the organisation which has developed over the 
years, impacting on the strategies developed and pursued. As such the search for 
strategic issues and their solution is directed by what has occurred previously within 
the organisation. There also exists across the organisation a strong sense of shared 
beliefs and assumptions based around what the organisation is about, what the future 
direction should be, and what constitutes threats or opportunities. While these 
shared beliefs are anchored in the organisation’s past they are also changeable, and 
do not just represent a perpetuation of the way things were. 
Given that strategy development is adaptive in nature it is interesting to question 
what is the interplay between the cultural and the planning dimensions? To what 
extent is the planning process operating to challenge the assumptions and influence 
of culture? Is it merely operating to provide data to support strategy development 
within the confines of the current culture? Alternatively is the planning process 
operating to reorientate the organisation away from a reliance on the taken for 
granted? In this scenario the strategy changes required may still be filtered through 
the organisation’s existing culture to reduce the potential for resistance and non 
implementation. Indeed, the shared assumptions and beliefs may even form a 
readily accessible and effective means through which required change can be 
communicated and achieved. 
Case C - The Professional Service Firm 
In comparison to the above case, the process of strategy development in this 
professional service partnership is seen to be primarily driven by its political and 
cultural processes and an adaptive or incremental response to an influential 
environment. 
Unlike many corporations where an individual’s involvement in decision making at 
an operational level may be strongly influenced by role and function, partnerships 
operate much less rigidly. Decision outcomes are more likely to reflect the level of 
power and influence held by various individuals and interest groups, the strength of 
which may change given different issues. It is interesting to find that such decision 
making forces are also reflected at a strategic level. 
W ithin this organisation the firm’s strategies, which are strongly related to the 
desires of interest groups, are likely to be developed by powerful individuals and 
groups through negotiation, debate and compromise. In this manner strategic 
problems are defined, and strategies which accommodate conflicting interests, are 
developed. Participation by interest groups, in the process is determined according 
to the issue involved; the same individuals or groups may not be involved in each 
decision. The strategy developed, then, reflects the interests of groups within the 
organisation. 
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Equally the firm’s long professional history and associated culture is likely to 
influence the identification of issues and options, and mediates the choices of 
strategies. Further the cultural beliefs and assumptions are likely to allow the 
various power groups to relate to each other within routines which are taken for 
granted. Within this culture, the strategies pursued emerge in an adaptive manner 
through a series of continual small scale changes and steps which those in the 
organisation believe enables the firm to keep in line with the business environment. 
‘- - 
- - 
.- 
In addition the firm , which does not generally seem  to be in a position to influence 
the environm ent in which it operates, appears to respond to environm ental 
influences rather than m aking strategic decisions unprom pted by external forces. 
Indeed strategies are not seen to develop in any system atic planned m anner; little in 
the way of set procedures for the developm ent of strategy exist. 
The danger is that this lack of planning m ay prevent the partnership looking forward 
in a proactive m anner; there m ay be too m uch reliance being placed on reactive 
responses to changes in the environm ent. Ultim ately this m ay lead to difficulties 
for the partnership, for whilst the prevailing strategic direction m ay reflect past 
successes, it m ay not entirely fit the requirem ents for sustained success in the 
future. The root cause of this problem  is that there m ay be little to challenge, and 
no questioning of, the taken for granted. 
However the appointm ent of a new chief executive changed this situation as 
illustrated in figure 6. The process of strategy developm ent was no longer 
characterised by a logical adaptive approach. Rather strategy is seen to relate 
prim arily to the power of the “big m an”. It is the aspirations for the future of the 
organisation which this individual has, which is seen to provide the focus for 
strategic direction. 
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Although influence over strategy developm ent here is still seen to be closely related 
to political processes, particularly those associated with the possession and 
utilisation of power, the importance of this dim ension has dim inished. Similarly, 
the influence of the organisation’s culture on strategy developm ent has also been 
subdued by the power of the m anaging partner. 
However the relationship which exists bet%een these three influences is of great 
significance. The professional ethos which perm eates the organisation and its 
m embers provides a com m on understanding and an established power structure 
through which political activity can be exercised. Indeed the com m and figure has 
emerged from  this structure. Thus, even though the m anaging partner is seen to 
have ultim ate control, his power is m oderated. In addition, as this individual has 
developed and progressed through the sam e professional and organisational structure 
as his colleagues, so he is likely to hold a sim ilar view of the world and the strategic 
issues faced. This in turn is likely to reduce the level of conflict within the 
organisation, particularly at a senior level. 
Looking to the future it is interesting to consider whether the authority of the new 
senior figure will prevail, or whether in fact the cultural and political dim ensions 
will once again dom inate the strategy developm ent process. 
Case D - The Archetypal Public Sector Organisation 
This exam ple is a com m on configuration of processes seen within the public sector. 
It is a process of strategy developm ent which is characterised by the dom inant 
external influence of the environm ent and by the internal influence from  cultural 
and political forces. This local governm ent division sees its freedom  of strategic 
m ovem ent to be severely lim ited by central governm ent legislation, expectations and 
financial control. Indeed the external environm ent is such that overall strategy is 
imposed by those outside, with internal power bases having little influence in this. 
However, political activity in the form  of negotiation and bargaining within the 
organisation are important factors in issues concerning the implementation of the 
strategy, for exam ple in the prioritisation of strategic tasks, and or in the allocation 
of financial resources. In fact in this part of the process the highly influential and 
deterministic external environment directly impacts on the internal power structure 
of the organisation. It is those groups who deal with the external environment and 
who operate as boundary spanners (Jemison, 1981), who attain greatest influence 
over the operational aspects of the strategy. Controlling externally derived 
resources and information, much of which is likely to relate to the external 
environment, it is these groups who could ultimately restrict or delay the 
implementation of the preset strategy. 
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The process of strategy development in this organisation could present substantial 
problems for change. It appears that what strategic change there is, is dictated by 
forces outside the organisation and through internal power struggles or political 
negotiation. Such a combination does not bode well for repositioning strategy if the 
operating environment were to change rapidly, for example by becoming more 
competitively oriented. There are however organisations that have faced such 
circumstances who have appeared to change the processes that drive the strategy 
within their organisation. 
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Figure 8, showing the profile of an organisation in transition between the public and 
private sector is an illustration of this. Under these conditions the strategy 
development process is perceived to be related to the planning and incremental 
dimensions though still under influence of the external environment as depicted by 
the enforced choice dimension. 
In particular, planning is perceived by the organisation’s members to be a major 
influence over the process of strategy development. This is seen to relate 
particularly to the existence of definite and precise strategic objectives and the 
assessment of potential strategic options against the explicit objectives to be 
achieved. However, planning in this instance is seen to be moderated by an 
adaptive approach to strategy development. New strategies deliberately build on 
existing strategies, with small continual changes to strategy ensuring that the 
organisation keeps in line with its business or operating environment. Indeed 
strategy is seen to emerge gradually as the organisation responds to the need to 
change and adjusts its strategy to match the changes which occur in its market 
place. 
Such contrasting patterns from two organisations operating in a similar environment 
poses interesting questions. Do the forces shown to be dominant in the transitional 
organisation represent what the members feel are the forces which will facilitate a 
smooth transition into the private sector, rather than a reflection of the processes 
actually at work? Do the organisation’s members perceive that with an archetypal 
planning process in place any potential problems associated with transition can 
effectively be planned out: for example that planning processes somehow diminish 
the political forces so typical of public sector organisations? Unfortunately, however 
appealing and traditionally acceptable the implementation of a planning system may 
be, this approach may well prove inappropriate if strategy development is driven by 
alternative forces, for example by the organisation’s culture or its political 
processes. Alternatively, executives may have been brought in from a different 
environment to effect the change, who do not appreciate the strengths of the cultural 
and political dimensions. If this is the case it is likely that problems emanating 
from the long established ways of doing things will be encountered upon the 
implementation of a new strategy. 
Examule of Differences in Process 
.- 
While the above examples of the strategy development process occurring within 
organisations presents the process as commonly agreed upon, differences between 
organisational groups have been identified. In the following case differences in 
terms of the process will be highlighted between board and senior level managers. 
Case E - Executive and Senior Manager 
Within this international manufacturing organisation there are two distinct groups 
which consist of those based in the organisation’s executive and those who are its 
senior managers. The organisation’s executive see the process of strategy 
development to be characterised by a planned intentional response to the 
organisation’s environment but within an adaptive or incremental approach. Indeed, 
defined strategic objectives are seen to be developed based on a systematic analysis 
of the business environment. These executives believe that specific procedures are 
followed both in the analysis of the environment and the development of potential 
solutions. However, this assessment is not solely captured within the planning 
procedures; rather strategies are modified through implementation. The resulting 
exposure to the business environment is not unintentional or haphazard, rather it is 
deliberate. There is also seen to be a clear view of the future which the 
organisation is progressing towards and which provides both the executive and other 
decision makers with a self contained criteria against which potential actions can be 
assessed. 
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This is not a view of strategy development shared by the organisation’s senior 
managers. While both groups see strategy developing in an adaptive manner, what 
constitutes the driving force of the process differs. Here strategy is seen to develop 
from the internal political activities of the organisation. Indeed, strategy is seen to 
be defined within the organisation by those groups with power. As such the 
strategies which are pursued are seen to reflect the interest of particular groups as 
opposed to the organisation as a whole. 
The idea of the organisation following defined and systematic procedures in 
defining its strategic direction is not seen by the senior managers. Neither are plans 
which communicate the strategy and the mechanisms for its achievement seen to 
exist. Rather influence over the process is attained through the control of critical 
resources and information. 
While there is disagreement on the major influences of strategy development, the 
two groups do agree on the relatively low influence of the external environment, the 
absence of any senior figure setting the strategic direction, and the minimal 
influence of the organisation’s culture over the process, a factor not surprising given 
that the organisation has recently been through major change including its 
acquisition by another corporation. 
Indeed this latter point may account for some of the differences. The process as 
perceived by the executive may reflect a new process which is being developed, 
even imposed as a result of the acquisition but which has not yet permeated to those 
at the level below. However regardless of the mechanisms through which the 
differences have emerged, they require careful management in terms of increasing 
the involvement of all relevant parties in the strategy development process. 
Conclusion and Implications 
The cases in this paper have indicated that strategy is not developed in an identical 
manner in all organisations. Rather the process is seen to differ. Indeed numerous 
configurations of strategy development have been identified between managers 
across industry sectors and between different organisations within the same sector. 
Furthermore the cases have also shown that the configurations of strategy 
development do not necessarily, or even usually, encompass the archetypal planning 
process, where strategy evolves as a result of a rational analytical approach. 
The consequence of this is that a unitary dimension to understanding strategy 
development is ineffective in conveying the complexity of the processes seen to 
exist. However, the approach discussed in this paper overcomes this problem 
through an integrated framework, combining six explanations of the strategy 
development process. 
In dealing with these six processes, as they are to be found in organisations, this 
paper has been descriptive and not prescriptive. There is no suggestion here that 
because such processes exist, this is how strategy should be managed. However it 
is important to understand the reality of strategy making in organisations, not least 
because those who seek to influence the strategy of organisations do so within that 
reality. There is little point in formulating strategies which may be elegant 
analytically without having an understanding of the processes which are actually at 
work. Although there has been no suggestion within this paper that any one mix of 
strategy development processes is superior to another, this would be an interesting 
area to be addressed by research. Could a number of optimum process 
configurations be found to exist in given competitive conditions? Indeed this type of 
question is becoming of increasing interest amongst researchers (Meyer, Tsui and 
Hinings, 1993). 
In the meantime, there are many practical benefits to managers in this work. 
Through the use of this integrated framework a clearer understanding of the strategy 
development process can be achieved and the process occurring within organisations 
can be surfaced. This understanding in turn acts to stimulate discussion and 
exploration by senior executives of the strategic development process in operation. 
This is of vital importance when an organisation faces a change in strategy, for if a 
change is to be successfully achieved, it is essential that the processes which are 
driving strategies are understood and managed. Moreover within an organisation it 
is possible that different perceptions will exist as to what these driving processes 
are: to ensure that strategy is implemented effectively managers need to understand 
the strategy development process as seen by their colleagues. The level of conflict 
typically encountered in strategy development may, then, be reduced and the 
efficiency of the process improved. 
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